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Intent to Use: A Failed Experiment? 
By AMY B. COHEN* 
WHEN CONGRESS ENACTED the Trademark Law Revision Act of 
19881 ("TLRA"), it made the first truly radical change in trademark 
law since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. By adding Section 
1 (b) to the Lanham Act allowing applications for federal trademark 
registration to be based on an intent to use the mark,2 Congress for 
the first time provided a way to apply for federal trademark registra­
tion before actual use of a trademark. Congress made this change to 
bring United States law into closer conformity with the practice else­
where in the world where use is not a prerequisite to trademark pro­
tection.3 Congress, however, did not go so far as abandoning 
completely the long American legal tradition that bases trademark 
ownership and protection on actual use of the mark in connection 
with the goods or services the mark is intended to identify. The TLRA, 
while allowing one to file an application based on an intent to use 
("ITU") a mark, makes registration itself contingent upon actual use 
within a set period of time after the issuance of a notice of allowance 
for the intent to use application. Thus, there is not complete protec­
tion until after actual use of the mark has occurred.4 The TLRA is 
Congress's attempt to straddle two positions: the American tradition 
requiring use for trademark protection and the emerging practice 
* Professor of Law, Western New England COllege School of Law. I would liKe to 
thank Pamela Chestek, Western New England College School of Law (2000), for her 
invaluable insights and assistance with this article. I also want to thank my husband and 
daughters for their continuing love and support. 
1. Act of November 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667. 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994). This statute provides: 
A person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good 
faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may apply to register the 
trademark under this chapter on the principal register hereby established ... by 
paying the prescribed fee [and filing in the Patent and Trademark Office an ap­
plication and a verified statement, in such form as may be prescribed by the 
Director.] 
[d. at §1051 (b) (1). 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 48-56. 
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elsewhere in the world that does not require such use prior to ob­
taining trademark protection. 
This half-way position has created numerous problems and has in 
many ways failed to accomplish the goal of bringing American law 
into conformity with the rest of the world. While attempting to clarify 
the definition of the term "use," it has instead created a morass of 
varying definitions. Procedural issues have arisen as to the effect of an 
intent to use application vis-a-vis those who oppose such applications 
or those who use the applied for mark before a registration actually 
issues. 5 The American position has also made it more difficult to de­
termine who is entitled to use a mark and under what circumstances. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether there are sufficient benefits 
from this change in the law to outweigh the numerous problems it has 
created. It is therefore time to re-evaluate the experiment with the 
intent to use approach and consider whether Congress should either 
turn back the clock to pre-1988 law or move forward toward a system 
that is less based on use of trademark as the prerequisite to legal 
protection. 
Part I of this article summarizes the pre-TLRA history of trade­
mark use and the changes made by the TLRA. Part II will address the 
confusion that exists with respect to the meaning of "use" in a post­
TLRA world. Part III identifies the procedural problems the TLRA has 
created. Part N considers whether the ITU provisions of the TLRA 
have achieved the Congressional goals for enacting the statute. Fi­
nally, in Part V, an argument is made for serious re-examination of the 
intent to use regime created by the TLRA. 
I. 	 The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 and Its 
Historical Background 
A. 	 An American Tradition: Use of the Mark As a Prerequisite to 
Protection 
American trademark law has its roots in the English common law, 
as the United States Supreme Court recognized in 1879 in the Trade­
Mark Cases: 
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the 
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to 
the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized 
by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this 
country, and by the statutes of some of the States .... This exclu­
5. 	 See infra text accompanying notes 174-254. 
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sive right was not created by the act of Congress, and does not now 
depend upon it for its enforcement. The whole system of trade­
mark property and the civil remedies for its protection existed long 
anterior to that act, and have remained in full force since its 
passage.6 
The Court further observed, in distinguishing trademarks from 
copyrights and patents, that, "[t]he trade-mark may be, and generally 
is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive 
symbol of the party using it. At common law the exclusive right to it grows 
out of its use, and not its mere adoption."7 
In Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn,8 the Supr~me Court recognized as a 
general proposition established by case law" [t] hat "the exclusive right 
to the use of the mark or device claimed as a trade-mark is founded 
on priority of appropriation; that is to say, the claimant of the trade­
mark must have been the first to use or employ the same on like arti­
cles of production ...."9 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,lO the 
Supreme Court again reaffirmed the common law requirement of use 
as a prerequisite to trademark rights and recognized that the require­
ment was based on a view that a trademark exists only to protect a 
person's "right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation 
and the good-will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interfer­
ence by others ...."11 Reviewing English common law precedent, the 
Court reasoned that since trademarks are intended to help identify 
the source of particular goods and services, the English courts had 
denied the existence of any property right in a trademark "except as 
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with 
which the mark is used."12 The Court concluded that the same rule 
applied in the United States as well.'3 
In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus CO.,14 the Supreme Court 
continued to adhere to the view that the common law based trade­
mark rights on the use of a mark to identify the source of goods and 
services; the Court concluded that a later user of a mark could con­
6. The Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). For more on the history of trade­
marks at common law, see Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical 
Histmy of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK RYrR. 305, 310-36 (1979); Benjamin G. Paster, 
Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK RYrR. 551 (1969). 
7. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (emphasis added). 
8. 150 U.S. 460 (1893). 
9. Id. at 463-64. 
10. 240 U.S. 403 (1916). 
11. Id. at 413. 
12. Id. at 414. 
13. See id. 
14. 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
686 UNIVERSIlY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
tinue to use the mark based on its priority in a geographically remote 
market because the later use would not be confused with the original 
use of the mark. 15 In other words, common law trademark rights only 
extended to the area where a user had achieved good will and public 
recognition of its trademark as the symbol of that good will. 16 
Thus, under the common law, it was important to determine the 
first date and the geographic extent of a particular claimant's use of a 
mark. Case law developed to define "first use" for purposes of such 
common law rights. That determination was heavily based on specific 
facts and circumstances, therefore creating inconsistencies and confu­
sion with respect to such determinations. For example, there were dis­
tinctions made in defining the necessary quantum of use between 
marks that were inherently distinctive, or "technical trademarks," and 
marks that had to acquire secondary meaning before they could re­
ceive trademark protection. 17 
15. See id. at 103. 
16. See id. 
17. For example, in Kathreiner's Malz.kafee Fabriken Mit Beschraenkter Haftung v. PastDr 
Kneipp Medicine Co., 82 F. 321 (7th Cir. 1897), the court found that a party's limited sales 
over a three year period in the United States were sufficient to establish trademark owner­
ship. See id. at 327. The court observed that it is not necessary: 
[T) hat a trade in an article should be fully established, in the sense that the arti­
cle be widely known .... It is enough, we think, if the article with the adopted 
brand upon it is actually a vendible article in the market, with intent by the pro­
prietor to continue its production and sale. It is not essential that its use has been 
long continued, or that the article should be widely known, or should have at­
tained great reputation. 
[d. at 326. 
In contrast, in Levy v. Waitt, 61 F. 1008 (1st Cir. 1894), the court considered a party's 
claim to trademark ownership unsuccessful where the party's claim to priority was based on 
sales considered too limited and the other party had engaged in more extensive use of the 
mark after those initial sales by the claimant. See id. at 1012. The court reasoned, 
[W)e believe no case can be found where, with intermittent offers of merchandise 
bearing a certain name, with such long lapses on the one side, and on the other 
the uninterrupted and innocent use of the same name for five years without ques­
tion, and a consequent growth of an extensive and valuable business, the equity 
courts have interfered in favor of the former against the latter. 
[d. at 1010. The court thus denied the first party relief, concluding that they "had neither 
made any appropriation, nor fixed in the market any conviction on the party of the public 
... , not to such an extent that there was any possibility of the public being defrauded by 
others' use of the name." [d. at 1012. 
In Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Leader Filling Stations Cmp., 196 N.E. 852 (1935), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court distinguished between the extent of use required to establish own­
ership of a "technical trademark," i.e., one that is neither generic or descriptive, and that 
required to establish ownership of a non-technical trademark: 
In the case of a technical trademark there must be a use in such circumstances as 
to publicity and length of time as to show an intention to adopt the word or 
symbol as a trade-mark .... In the case of a word not subject to exclusive appro­
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To provide more predictability as well as broader geographic pro­
tection, Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946,18 Although the 
Lanham Act provided expanded rights to those who took advantage of 
its provisions for fecleral registration, it did not pre-empt state or com­
mon law protection,19 In fact, registration is not considered to be a 
means of obtaining trademark ownership itself, but rather a way of 
obtaining certain statutory advantages not granted to those who 
merely relied on common law trademark protection,20 
Although the Lanham Act did not itself explicitly require com­
mon law trademark ownership as a prerequisite to registration, it did 
require the applicant to own and use the mark in interstate commerce 
as a prerequisite to registration,21 The common law insistence on use 
priation there must be such a use in connection with a product as to attach to the 
word a secondary meaning, through association, as denoting the product of the 
user. 
[d. at 854. Because the defendant in this case had not proven such secondary meaning with 
respect to the mark at issue, a mark considered to be descriptive, the court ruled in favor of 
the plaintiff, even though the defendant had been the first use to use the mark in connec­
tion with actual sales of the goods. [d. 
See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE LJ. 759, 764 
(1990); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and 
Synthesis: II, 30 COLUM. L. REv 759,764-68 (1930); 2]. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPF;TITION §§ 16:1,16:4-16:7,16:11 (4th ed. 2000). 
18. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051-1127 (1995). According to the Senate Report on the bill which led to the Lanham 
Act: 
The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trademarks in one stat­
ute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplity registration and to make it 
stronger and more liberal, to dispense with technical prohibitions and arbitrary 
provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief against infringement prompt 
and effective. 
S. REp. No. 1333, 79th Congo 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274. See also 1 
McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 5:4. 
19. See generally 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:3,19:8. 
20. See Zazu Designs V. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1992) (registra­
tion without actual use is insufficient to create rights in a mark); S Indus., Inc. V. Stone Age 
Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804-05 (N.D. III. 1998) (trademark rights are not ac­
quired by registration alone, but depend on use of the mark on goods); S Indus., Inc. V. 
Diamond Multimedia Sys., 991 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (N.D. III. 1998) (trademark rights are 
not acquired by registration alone, but depend on use of the mark on goods). See also Wise 
V. Bristol-Myers Co., 107 F. Supp. 800, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (invalidity of registration does 
not affect party's common law trademark rights); The Jim Dandy CO. V. Martha White 
Foods, Inc., 458 F.2d 1397,1402 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Lane,]., concurring) ("lack of capacity 
to register does not necessarily mean lack of prior ownership or lack of the right to op­
pose"). See also Carter, supra note 17, at 775-76. 
21. 15 U.S.C. §1051 (1994). See Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Criti­
cal Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. Rev. 233, 247-50; 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at 
§ 19:53. 
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as the prerequisite for trademark protection was thus not eliminated 
or overruled by Congress in 1946 when it enacted the Lanham Act.22 
Instead, there was a dual system for protection: common law protec­
tion based on actual use, and federal protection based also on actual 
use as well as use "in commerce," i.e., in the commerce "which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress."23 A party could oppose an applica­
tion to register or seek to cancel a registration on the grounds that 
that party had used the mark prior to the applicant/registrant and 
that the applicant/registrant's use was likely to cause confusion with 
the other's use.24 
Questions arose with respect to what quantum of "use" would suf­
fice to satisfY the federal requirements for registration as compared to 
the common law use requirement for trademark ownership. In Blue 
Bell, Inc. v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.,25 the Fifth Circuit addressed 
this issue where two companies were contesting ownership of the 
mark TIME OUT for men's dothing.26 The case arose under common 
law since neither party had applied to register the mark pursuant to 
the Lanham Act.27 Farah argued that an internal shipment to its sales 
managers should suffice to establish use prior to Blue Bell. Farah re­
lied on a Trademark Board decision, Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Mid­
west Chrome Process CO.,28 where such internal shipments had been 
considered sufficient for purposes of establishing "use in commerce" 
for registration purposes.29 The Fifth Circuit considered that case in­
apposite, ruling that it did not affect the analysis of common law use 
in trade, but dealt only with what would suffice for "use in commerce" 
for purposes of federal registration.30 Thus, the Court recognized that 
there were two different contexts in which "first use" had to be de­
fined-eo-ownership and federal registration-and that the quantum 
22. See, e.g., New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 417 (lst Cir. 1951) 
(ownership a condition precedent to registration). See also Macaulay v. Malt-Diastase Co., 4 
F.2d 944, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (only the owner of the trademark as determined by 
prior use and adoption, even if intrastate, can register the trademark pursuant to the 
Trademark Act of 1905; use in interstate commerce considered an additional requirement 
for registration, but not itself necessary to establish ownership). See 3 McCARTHY, supra 
note 17, at § 19:53. 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See generally 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:10, 19:103-06, 
19:113-15,19:117-19,19:123. 
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1063(a), 1064 (1995). 
25. 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975). 
26. See id. at 1262. 
27. See id. at 1264. 
28. 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 758 (T.T.A.B. 1974). 
29. See id. at 764-65. 
30. See Blue Bell, 508 F.2d at 1266-67. 
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of use required for one was not necessarily the same as that required 
for the other.31 
This created some confusion. As described by Professor Michael 
Davis,32 in early applications of the Lanham Act a party could obtain 
federal registration based on a minimal use in commerce as long as 
there was some true commercial use, even if wholly intrastate. Profes­
sor Davis pointed out that over time the federal courts and the Trade­
mark Trial and Appeal Board collapsed the minimal "use in 
commerce" requirement with the traditionally more demanding "use" 
requirement to allow applicants to apply for federal registration on 
the basis of minimal interstate activity alone, such as shipments across 
state lines of insignificant quantities of a given product.33 Professor 
Davis argued that this watering down of the prerequisites for federal 
registration resulted in part from pressure by companies and the 
trademark bar seeking to ensure a means to obtain trademark protec­
tion before entering the market with goods and services.34 
This watered down definition of "use" was coined "token use" and 
was the subject of a great deal of criticism because it seemed to favor 
larger companies at the expense of smaller companies and to make 
a sham of the traditional requirements of use for trademark pro­
tection.35 These complaints about the "token use" doctrine were 
31. See id. See also Davis, supra note 21, at 247-51. See also Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A., 
979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) ("use sufficient to register a mark is not necessarily 
enough to acquire rights in the absence of registration"); Nat'l Cable Television Assoc., 
Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1578 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (prior use in 
intrastate commerce is sufficient to oppose a mark, but not to register a mark). See generally 
3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:116. 
32. See Davis, supra note 21, at 251-59. 
33. E.g., Societe de Developments Et D'lnnovations Des Marche Agricoles Et 
Alimenfaires-Sodima-Union De Cooperatives Agricoles v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 
839,847 (D. Ore. 1987) (doctrine of token use provides that "a single instance of use, if 
accompanied by circumstances showing an intention to continue use is sufficient to estab­
lish a right to use" (citing Ritz Cycle v. Priss-Seabury, 235 F. 125 (1916)); a 2 year period of 
no sales following a $2.52 token sale did not invalidate plaintiff's trademark registration 
where product was allegedly under development). Compare Sharkskins Surf Gear v. San 
Jose Sharks, 1996 TIAB LEXIS 45, at *6-9 (1996) (where opposer's post-TLRAs registra­
tions were found to be based only on token use, i.e., a handful of products had been given 
to family and friends, registration was cancelled for failure to satisfy use requirements; 
TLRA held to have eliminated token use as a basis for registration). 
34. Davis, supra note 21, at 265-78. 
35. Professor Davis was highly critical of the token use doctrine. He argued that trade­
mark protection has an anti-competitive effect in that it distorts consumer preferences 
based on familiarity with a preferred trademark and the goods or services with which it is 
associated. [d. at 235-40. Thus, according to Davis: 
[T]rademark use is important because, to the extent it imposes a substantive 
(rather than a token) burden upon the marketer, there is some assurance that 
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one of the contributing reasons for the enactment of the TLRA in 
1988.36 
In addition to the conflicting definitions of "use" for purposes of 
common law ownership and federal registration that arose after the 
enactment of the Lanham Act, there is yet another doctrine and defi­
nition of use: use analogous to trademark use. This doctrine allows 
businesses to oppose federal trademark applications by another when 
the opposer can establish that there has been sufficient publicity to 
create a public association with its mark even before any of their 
goods or services have entered the marketplace. The claim would be 
valid as long as the opposer can also show actual commercial use 
within a reasonable time. Case law established that opposers could as­
sert such prior "use analogous to trademark use" to defeat an applica­
tion to register a trademark by another, even if that applicant could 
show that it made commercial use of the mark before any actual com­
mercial use by the opposer.37 
the anticompetitive and monopolistic grant of trademark rights is justified .... 
When trademark use is reduced to a procedural requirement, the trademark mo­
nopoly loses all social justification. 
[d. at 242-43. Professor Davis saw the efforts to pass intent-to-use legislation as led by busi­
ness groups and their lawyers seeking to lower the bar to trademark protection even fur­
ther. See id. at 259-63. See also Carter, supra note 17, discussed infra note 44. 
36. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5577,5581; H. REp. No. 100-1028 at 15 (1988). See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:110. 
37. The earliest use of the phrase "use analogous to trademark use" appeared in a 
slightly different context. In John Wood Mfg. Co. v. Servel, Inc., 77 F.2d 946 (C.C.P.A 
1935), a party opposing a trademark registration for the mark "hostess" claimed priority 
based on its use of the mark to designate a particular model of refrigerators it sold. Al­
though the opposer admitted that it had not affixed that mark to such goods, the court 
concluded that its use of the mark in its literature and advertising materials as well as the 
fact that it received orders for goods under that name was "analogous to trademark use" 
and thus sufficient to establish priority. That rather narrow definition of "use analogous to 
trademark use" was expanded in Lever Bros. Co. v. Nobio Prods., 103 F.2d 917 (C.c.P.A. 
1939), to cover an opposer's use of a slogan in advertising. More recently, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined "[ulse 'analogous' to trademark use" to mean "use 
of a nature and extent such as to create an association of the term with the user's goods," 
Malcolm Nicol & Co. v. Witco Corp., 881 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989), as for example, 
in advertising brochures, catalogues, newspapers, press releases and trade publications. 
Such use is sufficient to defeat a trademark registration by a party who affixes the mark to 
the goods and uses it in commerce after the opposer's analogous use, "even though the 
opposer itself is not entitled to federal registration because it has never used the term as an 
affixed 'trademark.'" [d. Accord., Nat'l. Cable Television v. Am. Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d 
1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991); The Jim Dandy Co. v. Martha White Foods, 458 F.2d 1397 
(C.C.P.A. 1972); Geo. Washington Mint v. Washington Mint, 349 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972). Cf Cullman Ventures v. Columbian Art Works, 717 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(court finds "use" analogous doctrine not relevant where relied on as defense to infringe­
ment as opposed to'where relied on to establish priority to oppose the registration of a 
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By 1988, there were thus several different definitions of the term 
"use," and thus considerable confusion about what was necessary to 
ensure rights to a trademark. 
B. 	 The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 and the Requirement 
of Use As a Prerequisite Eliminated 
In 1988, Congress made a radical change in American trademark 
law by allowing a party to apply for federal registration without having 
demonstrated use of the mark either in ordinary trade or in com­
merce, but rather on the basis of a bona fide intention to use the 
mark in commerce. The legislative history of the TLRA identified sev­
eral purposes behind this change. 
First, the change was considered necessary to prevent unfair treat­
ment of American companies as compared to foreign companies. In 
the Senate Report on the bill that became the TLRA, it was stated that 
"the United States is the only developed country that requires use of a 
mark before an application for registration may be filed."38 Since for­
eign applicants could rely on their foreign registrations to establish 
priority over an American applicant and could obtain those foreign 
registrations without use in their home country, a foreign applicant 
could therefore establish priority over an American applicant without 
having to show use of the mark anywhere.39 The Senate Report also 
considered the use requirement troublesome because of the uncer­
tainty it created for American businesses.4o The Report observed that 
it was as a result of this uncertainty that the courts had created and 
sanctioned the doctrine of "token use."41 
Token use is a contrived and commercially transparent practice­
nothing more than a legal fiction. At the same time, token use is 
essential under current law because it recognizes present day mar­
keting costs and realities; it reduces some of the legal and eco­
nomic risks associated with entering the marketplace; and it 
nominally achieves the threshold "use" required to apply for fed­
eral registration and the creation of trademark rights in advance of 
commercial use.42 
mark). See also infra text accompanying notes 117-28. See also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at 
§§ 16:12-16:14. 
38. S. REp. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 V.S.C.C.A.N. 
5577, 5581. 
39. 	 See id. 
40. 	 See id. 
41. 	 See id. 
42. 	 See id. at 6, 1988 V.S.C.C.A.N. at 5582. 
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The Report then identified some of the problems created by the 
token use doctrine: it was not available to all types of businesses, and it 
allowed companies to register based on minimal activity, thus poten­
tially clogging the trademark register with unused marks.43 
In order to reduce the uncertainty facing American trademark 
applicants and to eliminate the sham of token use, Congress passed 
the TLRA and its alternative basis for securing federal trademark re­
gistration: a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.44 How­
ever, before considering whether that Act has achieved these goals, it 
is necessary to first outline the essential steps of the lTV application 
process. 
c. 	 The Application Process Under Section l(b): The Intent-to-Use 
Provisions 
V nder Section 1 (b) of the Lanham Act as amended by the TLRA, 
a party can now file an application to register a trademark on the basis 
of that party's "bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the 
good faith of such person, to use the mark in commerce."45 The appli­
cant must verifY his or her belief that she or he is entitled to use the 
mark in commerce, that she or he has a bona fide intention to use the 
mark in commerce, and that no other person has the right to use the 
mark in circumstances where such is likely to cause confusion with the 
applicant's mark.46 
Once filed, the mark is subject to examination by an examiner in 
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to determine whether the 
43. 	 See id. 
44. Id. See also Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., 146 F.3d 350, 356-57 
(6th Cir. 1998) (discussing purposes of the TLRA, including elimination of token use doc­
trine). See also Traci L.Jones, Remedy Holes and Bottomless Rights: A Critique of the Intent-to-Use 
System of Trademark Registration, 59 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 159, 160 (1996); 3 McCAR­
THY, supra note 17, at § 19: 110. See Carter, supra note 17, at 779-81. Professor Carter was 
critical of the law's elimination of "use" as a requirement for applying for trademark pro­
tection. He argued that to the extent the ITU system allows marks that do not serve to 
identifY the good will associated with goods or services in the marketplace to be removed 
from the "available market language," id. at 763, it exacts an unmerited economic cost 
from potential competitors. Since the universe of words that can serve as effective trade­
marks is not infinite, making some words unavailable creates economic barriers, according 
to Professor Carter. See id. at 768-75. Since the TLRA makes it easier for parties to remove 
a word from the universe of available marks and to do so without establishing the market­
place significance of that word, it exacerbates this problem. Id. at 775-88. Professor Carter 
thus preferred the common law basis for determining trademark rights. Id. at 760. See also 
Davis, supra note 21, discussed at supra note 35. 
45. 	 15 U.S.c. § 1051(b) (1994). 
46. 	 See 15 U.S.c. § 1051 (b) (3). 
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mark is potentially eligible for registration, assuming that the appli­
cant later satisfies the requirement of filing a statement of use, as de­
scribed below. If the examiner so concludes, the mark is to be 
published in the Official Gazette of the PTO. Any party who believes 
that they would be damaged by the registration of that mark then has 
thirty days to file an opposition. If the opposition is not successful, 
then a notice of allowance is to be issued to the applicant.47 
The applicant then has six months from the date of the notice of 
allowance to file a verified statement that the mark is in use in com­
merce, specifying the date of first use and the goods or services with 
which it is being used.48 The applicant must also submit the required 
number of specimens illustrating such use along with the requisite 
fee. 49 The statute provides for extensions of time to file the statement 
of use for up to three years from the issuance of the notice of allow­
ance, although extensions beyond one year from the notice of allow­
ance are not to be granted absent a showing of good cause.50 All 
requests for extension must fnclude a verified statement of the appli­
cant's continued bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.51 
Failure to file a statement of use before the expiration of the initial 
period or of any extensions to such period results in the abandon­
ment of the application.52 
Once the statement of use is received by the PTO, it is to be ex­
amined,53 including a review of the mark's compliance with Section 2 
(a) through (e) of the Lanham Act, the sections which outline the 
grounds for which registration of a mark may be refused.54 If the state­
ment of use is accepted, a certificate of registration will be issued to 
the applicant, and notice of registration will be published in the Offi­
cial Gazette.55 
Therefore, the applicant'S right to registration is still contingent 
upon actual use of the mark. As the legislative history reveals, Con­
gress included this prerequisite of actual use before registration "to 
emphasize the central role that use continues to play in U.S. trade­
47. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1062-63 (1994). 
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(l) (1994). 
49. See id. 
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1015(d)(4) (1994). 
51. See id. 
52. See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051 (d) (2)-(4) (1994). 
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(I). 
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a)-(e) (1994). 
55. See 15 V.S.c. § 1051(d)(I). For more on the lTV application process, see 3 Me. 
CARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:12-19:25.1. 
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mark law."56 Congress also wanted to make it clear that "commercially 
transparent practice of 'token use' "57 was to be eliminated byamend­
ing the definition of "use in commerce" to read "the bona fide use of 
the mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to 
reserve a right in the mark."58 Thus, Congress lowered the threshold 
for filing an initial application, but tightened the ultimate standard 
for obtaining registration by eliminating token use and insisting on 
genuine commercial use before registration would issue. 
Section 7(c) of the Act, as amended by the TLRA, also had great 
significance for lTV applicants as well as traditional use-based appli­
cants. It provides in pertinent part that: 
(c) Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal reg­
ister provided by this Act, the filing of the application to register 
such mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring 
a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection with 
the goods or services specified in the registration against any other 
person except for a person whose maI;k has not been abandoned 
and who, prior to such filing­
(1) has used the mark; [or] 
(2) has filed an application to register the mark which is pend­
ing or has resulted in registration of the mark ....59 
Thus, an lTV applicant has "constructive use" as of the date of its 
initial application, even though it may not in fact use the mark in the 
marketplace for as long as three years after the notice of allowance has 
issued for that application. It can thereby establish priority over those 
who use a mark in trade before the lTV applicant has done so. 
These seemingly straightforward provisions have not reduced the 
uncertainty facing potential trademark registrants, but instead have 
added to it by creating new procedural and interpretive issues. 
n. The Muddled Meaning of "Use" 
As discussed above, even before the enactment of the TLRA there 
were multiple meanings of the word "use." To establish ownership of a 
trademark, a party had to establish use of the mark in trade; owner­
ship of an inherently distinctive mark would be established as of the 
time of that first actual use in trade whereas ownership of mark that 
was not inherently distinctive hinged on being the first party to estab­
56. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5577,5586. 
57. Id. at 44. See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5607. 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994). 
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lish secondary meaning of the mark, Le., public association of the 
mark with the alleged owner's goods or services. On the other hand, 
to be eligible for federal registration a party also had to use the mark 
"in commerce." Such a use could be minimal to establish an entitle­
ment to federal registration, but the applicant also had to have used 
the mark in trade, even if intrastate, to claim ownership of the mark. 
As the importance of trademark protection grew in the increasingly 
industrialized economy, courts created the doctrine of "token use" to 
ease the burdens on those seeking to obtain federal trademark protec­
tion and the doctrine of "use analogous to trademark use" to ease the 
burden on those seeking to oppose another's trademark 
registration.60 
One of the goals of the TLRA, as discussed above,61 was to elimi­
nate the doctrine of "token use" and to require "bona fide use of the 
mark in the ordinary course of trade" as the prerequisite to trademark 
ownership for federal purposes.62 At the same time, Congress recog­
nized the need to ease the burden on applicants for federal registra­
tion that had led to the creation of the token use doctrine to begin 
with and to bring American law into conformity with the laws in other 
places in the world that did not require actual use as a prerequisite to 
trademark protection. Thus, Congress enacted the intent-to-use provi­
sions to allow parties to apply for trademark registration before actual 
use of the mark, but made registration itself hinge upon a subsequent 
showing of actual use before a prescribed time period had elapsed. 
Although Congress wanted to eliminate the uncertainty caused in part 
by the conflicting and confusing definitions of use that the courts had 
generated under the pre-TLRA law, the TLRA has failed to accom­
plish that goal. There are still multiple and conflicting meanings of 
"use" which continue to confuse those attempting to determine trade­
mark ownership. 
A. What Is a Bona Fide Intent to Use? 
The TLRA requires an lTD applicant to demonstrate a "bona fide 
intent to use as the basis of its application." As interpreted by the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, this has led to a multifactored 
inquiry into the mindset of an applicant. 
60. See supra note 17. 
61. See supra notes 38-44. 
62. S. REp. No. 515, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5577, 5581-82. 
696 UNIVERSI1Y OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
In several opinions, the Trademark Board has addressed the 
question of what evidence an applicant must submit to demonstrate 
its bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. First, in Commo­
dore Electronics Limited v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha,63 the Board addressed 
the question of "whether the absence of any documents evidencing 
applicant's claimed intention to use its mark may be sufficient to con­
stitute objective proof of a lack of a bona fide intention to use."64 The 
Board explored the legislative history of the TLRA and found that 
Congress intended this requirement to focus on "an objective good­
faith test to establish that an applicant's intent is genuine."65 The 
Board quoted from the SenateJudiciary Committee Report on the bill 
that became the TLRA, which stated that: 
Although 'bona fide' is an accepted legal term, it can be read 
broadly or narrowly, subjectively or objectively, by a court or the 
Patent and Trademark Office. In connection with this bill, 'bona 
fide' should be read to mean a fair, objective determination of the 
applicant'S intent based on all the circumstances.66 
The Board then went on to hold that 
[A]bsent other facts which adequately explain or outweigh the fail­
ure of an applicant to have any documents supportive of or bear­
ing on its claimed intent to use its mark in commerce, the absence 
of any documentary evidence on the part of an applicant regarding 
such intent is sufficient to prove that the applicant lacks a bona 
fide intention to use its mark in commerce as required by Section 
l(b).67 
The Board recognized, however, that an applicant could attempt 
to rebut this by introducing additional evidence regarding its bona 
fide intent to use. On the evidence before it, the Board concluded 
that sufficient evidence had been introduced to create questions of 
material fact. 68 Specifically, the applicant had introduced evidence re­
garding its use of a mark (AJCBM) similar to the one in its lTV appli­
cation (ACBM) on similar goods; the Board considered this evidence . 
of the applicant's capacity to produce the goods listed in its current 
application.69 On the other hand, it also considered it evidence sup­
porting the opposer's claim of applicant'S absence of a bona fide in­
63. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (T.T.A.B. 1993). 
64. [d. at 1506. 
65. !d. 
66. S. REp. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1988), quoted in Commodore Elees. 
Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1506 n.7, reprinted in 1988 V.S.C.CAN. 
5577, 5586-87. 
67. Commodore Elees. Ltd., 26 V.S.P.Q.2d at 1507. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
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tention to use the mark CBM, since the only mark that applicant had 
used on the relevant goods was JCBM.70 Observing that questions of 
intent are largely factual and thus generally unsuited to disposition by 
summary judgment, the Board denied both parties' motions for sum­
mary judgment.71 
The applicant in Lane Limited v. Jackson International Trading Com­
pany Kurt D. Bruhl Gesell5chaft m.b. G. & Co. KG72 had greater success 
on its motion for summary judgment on the question of its bona fide 
intention to use. Like the applicant in Commodore, the applicant in 
Lane relied on evidence of its use of a similar mark on the same cate­
gory of goods as evidence of its bona fide intention to use the neW 
mark on such goods.73 The applicant also relied on evidence of its 
efforts to license its mark outside of the United States and to obtain 
non-U.S. licensees.74 The opposer relied on this same evidence to dis­
prove the applicant's intention to use the mark in commerce, arguing 
that it was irrelevant to the applicant's intention to use the subject 
mark in United States commerce.75 The opposer also argued that evi­
dence of the applicant's attempts to secure an American licensee were 
irrelevant since they occurred ten months after the date of the filing 
of the lTU application.76 
In analyzing the evidence, the Board observed that although an 
applicant's "mere statement of subjective intention, without more, 
would be insufficient to establish applicant's bona fide intention to 
use the mark in commerce,"77 the language and the legislative history 
of the TLRA failed to specify "the particular type or quantum of objec­
tive evidence that an applicant must produce to corroborate or de­
fend its claimed bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce."78 
The Board concluded that the applicant in this case, unlike the appli­
cant in Commodore, had submitted some documentary evidence and 
that that evidence was sufficient to establish the applicant's bona fide 
intention to use.79 The Board considered the applicant's efforts to se­
cure non-U.S. licensees relevant as it tended to prove the existence of 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 1507-08. 
72. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
73. See id. at 1354-55. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. at 1354. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. at 1355. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 1356. 
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a business plan and licensing program.80 The Board also considered 
probative the predecessor's use of a similar mark on similar goods in 
that it demonstrated prior experience and success in the relevant in­
dustry.8' Further, the Board considered the evidence of applicant's 
activities ten months after its application relevant, reasoning the 
neither the statute nor Commodore imposed any "specific requirement 
as to the contemporaneousness of an applicant's documentary evi­
dence corroborating its claim of bona fide intention."82 
In Salacuse v. Ginger Spirits83 a registrant defended itself against a 
petition to cancel on the grounds that the petitioner's own registra­
tions were invalid because the petitioner had lacked a bona fide inten­
tion to use the mark when it applied for registration.84 Mter 
discussing the procedural issues, the Board addressed the merits of 
the respondent'S arguments, citing both Lane and Commodore.85 The 
Board quoted from the legislative history of the TLRA with respect to 
what types of evidence might be relevant to disprove a bona fide inten­
tion to use the mark: 
For example, the applicant may have filed numerous intent-ta-use 
applications to register the same mark for many more new prod­
ucts than are contemplated, numerous intent-to-use applications 
for a variety of desirable trademarks intended to be used on [a] 
single new product, numerous intent-to-use applications to register 
marks consisting of or incorporating descriptive terms relating to a 
contemplated new product, numerous intent-ta-use applications 
which have lapsed because no timely declaration of use has been 
filed, an excessive number of intent-ta-use applications to register 
marks which ultimately were not actually used, an excessive num­
ber of intent-ta-use applications in relation to the number of prod­
ucts the applicant is likely to introduce under the applied-for 
marks during the pendency of the applications, or applications un­
reasonably lacking in specificity in describing the proposed goods. 
Other circumstances may also indicate the absence of genuine 
bona fide intent to actually use the mark.86 
The Board found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to the petitioner's bona fide intent based on evidence of the numer­
ous lTV applications it had filed for the mark for "a wide variety of 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. [d. 
83. 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415 (T.T.A.B. 1997). 
84. See id. at 1416-17. 
85. See id. at 1420. 
86. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 23-24, 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5586, 
as quoted in Salacuse v. Ginger Spirits, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. See also 3 McCARTHY, supra 
note 17, at §§ 19:12-14. 
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goods ranging from food and beverages to luggage to furniture to 
motor vehicles."87 Thus, petitioner's motion for summary judgment 
on the question of its bona fide intent was denied.88 
In Advertising to Women v. Gianni Versace S.p.A.,89 the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois indicated its approval of the ap­
proach taken by the Board to determinations of a bona fide intent to 
use a mark.90 Citing the Lane decision and the legislative history of the 
TLRA, it called for a "fair, objective determination of all the circum­
stances,"91 including the same factors reflecting on the applicant's in­
tent mentioned in Lane. In the case before it, the court concluded 
that summary judgment on the issue of the applicant's bona fide in­
tent was inappropriate, and that the issue was "best resolved at trial 
and upon a full exposition of the evidence."92 
These decisions indicate that although it may not be difficult for 
an lTV applicant to defeat an opposer's motion for summary judg­
ment with respect to the issue of its bona fide intention to use a mark, 
it will be difficult in many cases for an lTV applicant to obtain sum­
mary judgment on this issue, meaning that most of such matters will 
necessitate a trial. This gives those who wish to oppose an lTV applica­
87. Saiacuse, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. 
88. See id. Other Board decisions reveal the difficulty of defining what quantity or 
quality of evidence will suffice to demonstrate bona fide intent to use or a lack thereof. In 
Discovery Communications, Inc. v. Cooper, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 185 (2000) (not citable as 
precedent), the Board considered an affidavit from the applicant describing "an informal 
analysis of the educational toy and educational printed materials markets," id. at *4, that he 
had engaged in prior to filing his ITU application and a trademark search he had re­
quested prior to filing sufficient evidence of his bona fide intent to use to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact and to survive summary judgment. The applicant in Pixel Instruments 
Corp. v. Sweven Corp., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 715 (1999) (not citable as precedent), was 
granted summary judgment on this issue of its bona fide intention to use the mark on the 
basis of evidence of steps taken to create a graphic design/logo for the mark and prepara­
tion of a brochure two months after the filing the ITU application. Relying on the Lane 
decision, the Board concluded that these activities were "sufficiently contemporaneous to 
the application filing date to serve as corroboration of applicant'S declaration in the appli­
cation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce." Id. at *6. See also Burroughs 
Wellcome Co. v. Nutrience, 1996 TTAB LEXIS 499 (1996) (not citable as precedent) (op­
poser's motion for summary judgment denied even though applicant had submitted no 
documentary evidence of its intent to use the mark other than a later submitted sworn 
statement of its continuing intention to use the mark). Cf American Forests v. Sanders, 
1999 TTAB LEXIS 529 (1999) (not citable as precedent) (no bona fide intention to use 
the mark found where individual applicant planned to use mark not individually, but as 
part of a partnership arrangement). 
89. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12490 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
90. See id. at *12-13. 
91. Id. at *12. 
92. Id. at *5. 
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tion a rather simple method of delaying the notice of allowance and 
the ultimate registration of such marks. Such delays undermine the 
Congressional goal of simplifying the application process for those 
wishing to apply based on the intention to use the mark. The more 
evidence of intent these applicants need to produce, the more cum­
bersome the process and the less effective it will be as an alternative to 
the traditional use-based application process. 
B. 	 What Constitutes "Prior Use" Sufficient to Oppose Successfully 
an lTV Application? 
Parties who believe they may be damaged by an lTV application 
can file an opposition to that application. One traditional basis for 
opposing a use-based application was prior use by the opposer of a 
mark that is likely to be confused with the applicant's mark.93 Since 
"use" is not required for an lTV application itself, questions arose 
about the continuing validity of such an opposition and about how to 
determine "priority of use" between an lTV applicant and an opposer 
claiming prior use. 
In Allard Enterprises v. Advanced Programming Resources,94 the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that the changes made by the TLRA did not alter the way 
courts should determine priority of use as between two parties claim­
ing ownership of a trademark.95 Although the case did not involve 
lTV applications, it reaffirmed that a party can defend itself against a 
registrant's claim of trademark infringement by demonstrating its 
"first actual use of a mark in a genuine commercial transaction" prior 
to the registrant's first use.96 The court also noted that "ownership 
may be established even if the first uses are not extensive and do not 
result in deep market penetration or widespread recognition."97 As 
applied to the case before it which involved a mark to be used in con­
nection with employee placement services, the court concluded that 
the defendant had established its priority of use by using the mark "on 
at least one fax, on at least one resume, and in numerous other solici­
tations, as they offered [their] services to several employers . . . . "98 
The court further found that the defendant's use was sufficiently pub­
lic, as several large companies identified the mark with defendant, 
93. 	 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994). 
94. 	 146 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 1998). 
95. 	 See id. at 357. 
96. 	 [d. at 358. 
97. 	 [d. 
98. 	 [d. at 359. 
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and that defendant's use was sufficiently consistent and continuous 
over several years to establish priority.99 The court reached this con­
clusion even though the defendant had not in fact placed one em­
ployee with an employer and had primarily been engaged in a word­
of-mouth campaign to find employers with potential positions that 
might need filling. loo Thus, the court did not define the standard of 
use to establish priority very strictly and relied on established pre­
TLRA law to define that standard. 
The Sixth Circuit applied the same standard in Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Carmax, Inc.,101 but in the context of an attempt to establish 
priority predating the filing date of plaintiff's lTV application. The 
court recognized that a party's use prior to the applicant's filing of an 
lTV application could trump the constructive use date. 102 In Circuit 
City Stores, however, the court concluded that the defendant's activities 
which predated the plaintiff's constructive use date were not sufficient 
to constitute actual use. 103 Although the defendant had used the mark 
in radio advertisements that were aired extensively during that rele­
vant time period, had used the mark on various business documents, 
and had established some recognition in the local trade, the court 
pointed to the defendant's failure to use the mark in other aspects of 
its business for example, in its phone listing or printed advertise­
ments, and its failure to introduce evidence of consumer awareness of 
its mark. l04 The court concluded that there had not been actual use 
of the mark by defendant to establish its priority over the plaintiff. l05 
The court distinguished its decision in Allard by pointing to the evi­
dence there of widespread public recognition. l06 Although the mark 
at issue was found to be suggestive, thus not requiring secondary 
meaning to establish ownership,107 the court nevertheless placed 
great weight on the degree of public recognition: 
Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring 
proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative 
of a party's actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning 
is not required .... Public recognition is probative of a party's 
actual use of a mark for the obvious reason that the public cannot 
99. 	 See id. at 359-60. 
100. See id. 
101. 165 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1999). 
102. See id. at 1053. 
103. See id. at 1055. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 1053. 
106. See id. at 1055. 
107. See id. at 1054. 
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be aware of a mark's association with a service or product unless 
the party has actually used the mark to create this association. lOB 
Thus, since the defendant in Allard had been able to prove wide­
spread public awareness of its mark whereas the defendant in Circuit 
City had not, the court found reason to affirm the district court's rul­
ing that the defendant in Circuit City had not established use prior to 
the plaintiff's constructive use date. The Sixth Circuit thus has placed 
critical importance on the proof of public recognition of the mark 
and its association with the party claiming ownership for establishing 
priority over a later filed lTV applicant or a later user. 
That emphasis on public recognition is also evident in the Sev­
enth Circuit's decision in Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Foot
ball Company.109 In that case Blastoff had filed two lTV applications for 
the mark ST. LOVIS RAMS on March 10, 1995, two months after the 
owner of the Los Angeles Rams publicly announced at a press confer­
ence that the Los Angeles Rams football franchise would be relocating 
to St. Louis. The press conference was covered by the local and na­
tional media which reported the announcement in papers and other 
media nationwide. llo Even before that announcement, there had 
been reports beginning as early as December 1993 in newspapers of a 
possible move of the team to St. Louis, and shortly after the press 
conference the team began selling licenses for the right to acquire 
seasons tickets to Rams games in St. Louis. 111 Officially licensed mer­
chandise bearing the ST. LOVIS RAMS mark were not sold until 
April, 1995, after Blastoffs filing date, and Blastoff filed suit seeking a 
declaration of his rights to the trademark and other remedies.11 2 The 
district court granted the defendants, the owners of the team, sum­
mary judgment, and Blastoff appealed. 113 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the lower court's determination 
that the defendants had established priority of use of the ST. LOVIS 
RAMS mark because prior to Blastoff's filing of his lTV application, "a 
significant portion of the public associated the mark with the Rams 
football club"114 as a result of the publicity on and after the press con­
108. [d. at 1055. Accord, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 
174 F.3d 1036, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (registration of domain name with intent to use it 
commercially is not sufficient to establish priority because not sufficiently public). 
109. 188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999). 

llO. See id. at 431. 

lll. See id. 

ll2. See id. at 430-31. 

ll3. See id. at 431. 

114. [d. at 434. 
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ference and a result of the prior use of the very similar mark LOS 
ANGELES RAMS in connection with the same football club. I 15 Thus, 
although no games had been played and no licensed merchandise 
had been sold by defendant as of Blastoffs filing date, the public asso­
ciation of the mark with the defendant was sufficient to establish pri­
ority of use. 1l6 
The Federal Circuit has also defined a fairly demanding standard 
of proof for establishing priority. In T.A.B. Systems v. Pactel Teletrac,117 
the Federal Circuit vacated the Trademark Board's grant of summary 
judgment to Pactel opposing T.A.B.'s application to register the mark 
TELETRAC for automobile tracking services.118 The Board had con­
cluded that Pactel had established priority by "use analogous to trade­
mark use," based on evidence of use of the mark in press releases, 
press kits, slide show presentations to seven potential customers, pres­
ence at a trade show, marketing brochures, and newspaper articles 
covering Pactel's planned services. 119 However, Pac tel had not yet pro­
vided any actual services using the mark. The Federal Circuit dis­
agreed with the Board, finding such evidence insufficient. 120 The 
court noted that only one of the press releases had been widely distrib­
uted and that there was a lack of evidence as to widespread distribu­
tion of the other materials as well. 121 The court concluded that 
Pactel's evidence failed to meet the standard necessary to establish use 
analogous to trademark use: "[A]dvertising of sufficient clarity and 
repetition to create the required identification must have reached a 
substantial portion of the public that might be expected to purchase 
the service."122 
The Trademark Board has also been demanding in its definition 
of use analogous to trademark use. For example, in Universal Technolo­
gies v.Jillson and Roberts, Inc.,123 Universal Technologies petitioned to 
cancel a registration owned by Jillson and Roberts on the basis of Uni­
versal's alleged priority based on pre-sales solicitation activities, in­
cluding letters to potential customers, attendance at a trade show, and 
1I5. See id. at 434. 

1I6. See id. at 434-35. 

1I7. 77 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

1I8. See id. at 1378. 

1I9. See id. at 1373. 

120. See id. at 1375. 
121. See id. 
122. [d. at 1377. See also Windows User, Inc. V. Reed Bus. Publ'g. Ltd. 805 F. Supp. 103 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (plaintiff's preparatory activities insufficient to establish likelihood of suc­
cess of proving priority over defendant for purposes of request for preliminary injunction). 
123. 1997 TTAB LEXIS 163 (1997). 
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hiring a sales representative. 124 The Board, relying on the court's rul­
ing in 1~A.B. v. Pactel, ruled that such evidence was insufficient to es­
tablish priority.125 Similarly, in RocinLaboratories, Inc. v. Surgijet, Inc.,126 
use of the mark on a website to promote a medical device and making 
a prototype, carrying it across state lines, and using it on patients were 
considered insufficient to establish prior use in an opposition pro­
ceeding because such activities did not "in any way establish that the 
trademark was affixed thereto, or that relevant purchasers were aware 
of this use."127 The Board reasoned, "While it is well settled that an 
opposer may base its opposition on prior use of a term in a manner 
analogous to trademark use; it is also true that such an opposition can 
succeed only where the 'analogous use' is of such a nature and extent 
as to create public identification of the term with opposer's 
product."128 
The Third Circuit has taken an even more stringent approach to 
defining use for purposes of establishing priority over an lTV applica­
tion. In Lucent Information Management v. Lucent Technologies,129 the 
court applied a four-part test to determine whether the plaintiff had 
proven actual use of the mark LUCENT prior to the date of the defen­
dant's lTV application. Relying upon its earlier decision in Natural 
Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx,130 the Court concluded that 
the plaintiff had to establish that the "market penetration of a trade­
mark in an area is sufficient to warrant protection ..."131 by introduc­
ing evidence of the sales volume of the trademarked product, the 
growth trends of that product, the number of persons actually 
purchasing the product in relation to potential customers, and the 
extent of advertising. 132 Based on these four factors, the court con­
cluded that the plaintiff had not established prior use, given that it 
had made only one sale, had not invested in advertising, had not ex­
124. See id. at *8. 
125. See id. at *22. 
126. 1999 TIAB LEXIS 458 (1999) (not citable as precedent). 
127. [d. at *6. 
128. [d. at *7. See also Trimedyne, Inc. v. Myriadlase, Inc., 1997 TIAB LEXIS 391 
(1997) (not citable as precedent) (promotional activities insufficient). Cf Snake River 
Brewing Co. v. Lewis & Clark Snake River Beverage Co., 1997 TIAB LEXIS 155 (1997) 
(lTV applicant's use of mark to solicit investors and distributors of its product held to be 
insufficiently public to constitute "use analogous to trademark use" to defeat opposer's 
claim to priority based on actual commercial use of the mark). 
129. 186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 1999). 
130. 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985). 
131. 186 F.3d at 317 (quoting Natural Footwear Ltd. V. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 
F.2d 1383, 1398 (3d Cir. 1985». 
132. See Lucent, 186 F.3d at 317. 
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panded beyond its initial set-up, and had made relatively few sales 
presentations. 133 
Judge Ackerman dissented from the majority's decision, arguing 
that the Court had applied the wrong standard. 134 In the dissent's 
view the majority had erroneously applied the standard for determin­
ing the extent of geographic penetration in conflicts between users in 
different geographic regions. 135 Judge Ackerman concluded that 
under the Allard test for prior use, the plaintiff had met its burden of 
demonstrating sufficient use to establish priority over the defen­
dant. 136 He argued that the m<yority's stringent definition of use for 
purposes of determining priority would undermine the purposes of 
trademark law, especially in today's economy: 
In this global economy where goods are often sold over a wide area 
rather than in a neighborhood store, the majority's rule penalizes 
small companies who attempt to take advantage of the national 
market. It is ironic that the majority sets forth such a high standard 
of use in this day and age when there is a technological revolution 
underway in which the internet permits small trademark users to 
sell their goods and services to broad geographic areas. The major­
ity's standard of use places a legal straigacket on those companies 
and deprives them of all common law trademark rights. 137 
In contrast to these strict standards, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York took a seemingly quite lenient ap­
proach for defining the test to establish priority over an lTV applica­
tion in Redisar Limited v. Virgin Enterprises Limited. 138 In that case the 
plaintiff had filed an lTV application for the mark VIRGIN to be used 
in connection with cola and argued that the defendant had not estab­
lished prior use of the mark VIRGIN since the defendant had not 
used the mark on cola but only on unrelated products. 139 The court, 
however, refused to vacate the temporary restraining order it had is­
sued in the defendant's favor, reasoning that the defendant might suf­
fer hardship and irreparable harm if the plaintiff introduced its cola 
into the market under the trademark VIRGIN.140 Thus, without a full 
hearing on the f~ctual issues regarding likelihood of confusion, the 
court impeded an lTV applicant's ability to begin actual use of its 
133. See id. at 317-18. 
134. See id. at 318 (Ackerman, j., dissenting). 
135. See id. at 323-26. 
136. See id. at 320-23. 
137. ld. at 325 (Ackerman, j., dissenting). 
138. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2020 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
139. See id. at 2021. 
140. See id. at 2022-23. 
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mark because of another's prior use of the mark on unrelated 
products. 141 
There is thus a conflict among the various Circuits with respect to 
defining the extent of activity necessary to establish priority over an 
lTV application. Whereas the Third Circuit in Lucent Information Man­
agement, the Federal Circuit, and the Trademark Board have adopted 
a rather stringent standard in their determinations, other courts have 
continued to use a more lenient standard for determining "use analo­
gous to trademark use" to protect those who have engaged in suffi­
cient pre-sales activities to create public recognition. Thus, an lTV 
applicant cannot be assured of any rights even if it does file as early as 
possible and before any actual sales by another party.142 
C. 	 What Constitutes Sufficient "Vse" to Allow an lTV Applicant to 
"Tack" on Activities Prior to Its lTV Filing Date? 
In Dyneer Corp. v. Automotive Products,143 the Trademark Board 
faced what it considered to be an issue of first impression: under what 
circumstances could an lTV applicant rely on use that predated its fil­
ing of the lTV application in order to establish priority over an op­
poser who claimed to have used the mark before that filing date? In 
the case the applicant had filed its lTV application on November 8, 
1991, but the opposer claimed that its activities prior to that date were 
sufficient to establish its priority. 144 In response, the applicant asserted 
that its predecessor in interest had in fact been engaged in "use analo­
gous to trademark use" several years prior to the opposer's activi­
ties. 145 Applicant argued that it should be able to "tack" these earlier 
activities on to its lTV application to establish its priority over op­
poser. 146 Opposer argued that applicant should not be able to take 
advantage of those activities, especially in light of the fact that there 
had been no activity during more than a two year period between the 
predecessor's activities and applicant's lTV application. 147 
141. 	 See also Housing & SelVices, Inc. v. Minton, 1997 No. 97 Civ. 2725 (SHS), 1997 
V.S. Dist. LEXIS 8883 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (promotional and preparatory activities to restore 
and reopen a playhouse were sufficient "use analogous to trademark use" to defeat defen­
dant's claim to priority based in part on the date of fili,ng of his lTV application). 
142. See alsoJones, supra note 44, at 177-80 (arguing that if the standard for establish­
ing priority over an lTV applicant is made too demanding, then lTV registrants may have 
rights that are unduly broad). 
143. 	 37 V.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (T.T.A.B. 1995). 
144. 	 See id. at 1254-55. 
145. 	 See id. at 1256. 
146. 	 See id. 
147. 	 See id. at 1257. 
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The Board ruled that an applicant should be allowed to tack ac­
tivities predating the filing of its lTV application in order to establish 
priority over an opposer.148 The Board recognized, however, that if an 
applicant relies on use analogous to trademark use for purposes of 
such tacking, it needed to demonstrate also that it had "engaged in a 
continuing effort to cultivate an association of the ... mark with itself 
and its goods"149 up to the time of the filing of the lTV application. 
The Board thus modified the usual requirements for use analogous to 
trademark use.150 Whereas the traditional use of this doctrine for pur­
poses of establishing priority over a use-based applicant requires a 
showing of actual trademark use by the opposer within a commercially 
reasonable period of time, the Board modified the test to require 
proof by the applicant only of a continuing effort to create the associa­
tion between the mark and the applicant up until the applicant'S fil­
ing of the lTV application.151 Since there were questions of fact that 
needed to be resolved with respect to that issue, the Board denied 
both parties' motions for summary judgment.152 
Thus, the creation of the lTV regime has led to new issues with 
respect to tacking and with respect to the meaning of "use analogous 
to trademark use" in the context of such tacking. By reducing the bur­
den on lTV applicants who wish to establish priority by demonstrating 
"use analogous to trademark use," the Board has created two different 
standards: one for lTV applicants and another for opposers and use­
based applicants.153 This double standard and the continuing confu­
sion over what will constitute "use analogous to trademark use" will 
only serve to increase the uncertainty regarding lTV applications. 
D. 	 What Will Constitute "Vse" for Purposes of the Statement 
of Use? 
As discussed above,154 an lTV applicant has up to three years af­
ter the issuance of the notice of allowance to file a statement of use 
and thus complete the requirements for obtaining registration. Fail­
148. 	 See id. at 1256. 
149. 	 [d. 
150. 	 See id . .. 
151. 	 See id. 
152. 	 See id. at 1257. 
153. See also Corporate Document Serv., Inc. v. I.C.E.D. Mgmt., Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1477, 1479 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (allowing applicant to tack on to its ITU application 
wholly intrastate activities in order to establish priority over an opposer which used the 
mark prior to the applicant's filing of the ITU application). 
154. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
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ure to file a satisfactory statement of use in a timely fashion will render 
the application and the notice of allowance invalid, and the applicant 
will lose its right to register that mark pursuant to that application. 
The Trademark Board has taken a rather strict approach to determin­
ing the adequacy of statements of use, both in terms of technical re­
quirements155 and the substantive requirement that the applicant 
actually use the mark in the ordinary course of trade before filing the 
statement of use. 
Thus, in yet another context, the definition of "use" becomes crit­
ical: What activities will suffice to satisfy the requirements for the state­
ment of use? Congress made it clear that token use would no longer 
suffice for registration under the "use" based registration provision,156 
and the courts and the Board have recognized that "token use" has 
been eliminated as a basis for filing a use-based application. 157 In de­
termining the sufficiency of use for purposes of the statement of use 
filed in connection with an ITU application, a similarly demanding 
standard has been exacted. In Harker's, Inc. v. Kelley,158 the petitioner 
argued that respondent had not engaged in sufficient commercial ac­
tivities to support her statement of use filed in connection with an 
ITU application.159 The respondent had filed an ITU application on 
July 15, 1991, for the mark FOOD DUDES to be used in connection 
with the production of educational television programs about nutri­
tion. Although the respondent had engaged in a great deal of prepar­
atory and promotional activities relating to these television programs, 
the Board concluded that as of the date of the filing of her statement 
of use on February 26, 1993, the respondent had not actually used the 
mark in a way that satisfied the requirements for filing a statement of 
use.160 The Board observed that: 
155. For example, the applicant must include specimens demonstrating their use of 
the mark in connection with the goods or seIVices identified on the notice of allowance, 
not other goods or seIVices. See In re Goldencare, 1998 TIAB LEXIS 205 (1998) (not 
citable as precedent). 
156. See 15 U.S.C. §1051 (a) (1994). 
157. E.g., James E. White v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 96-1096, 1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 3079 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (TLRA eliminated token use as basis for registration; appli­
cant's use did not meet standard required for registration); Sharkskin Surf Gear, Inc. v. 
San Jose Sharks, 1996 TIAB LEXIS 45, at *8 (distribution of a handful of the registrant's 
product was merely token use and not sufficient to survive a petition to cancel). See also 
Advertising to Women v. Gianni Versace, No. 98-61553, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12490, at 
*14 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (TLRA eliminated token use as basis for registration). 
158. 1996 TTAB LEXIS 283 (1996) (not citable as precedent). 
159. See id. at *16. 
160. See id. 
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[W]hile respondent began offering her production services associ­
ated with the mark FQOD DUDES for sale in May 1991, has contin­
uously since that date been in a position to render these services, 
and has extensively promoted the services in conjunction with the 
mark, the services had not actually been rendered as of the filing 
date of respondent's statement of use, namely February 26, 
1993.161 
The fact that the applicant had created a promotional video, au­
dio cassette and booklet to be used in marketing her services was in­
sufficient in light of her failure to perform production services for any 
customers prior to filing her statement of use. The Board held that 
promotional activities are not sufficient to serve as the basis of federal 
registration, distinguishing the registration context from the priority 
context where such activities may suffice as use analogous to trade­
mark use to establish priority.162 The Board in fact recognized that 
respondent could rely on these very same promotional activities to 
establish priority over the petitioner in a later proceeding, but held 
that they were insufficient to support her statement of use and thus 
the registrations which had been issued in her favor. 163 
Respondent later sought to revive her claim in a new proceeding, 
relying on new evidence of her actual use of the mark, FOOD 
DUDES, prior to her statement of use.164 She asserted that she had 
completed an installment of her proposed. television program and 
had made actual sales of videotapes of that installment to out-of-state 
customers. The Board found the completion of an installment of the 
television show and out of state sales were insufficient to constitute use 
since she had not produced these videotapes at the request of, or for 
the benefit of, any customers and thus had not engaged in production 
services, the services recited as the subject of her trademark applica­
tion. Thus, the Board entered final judgment granting the petition to 
cancel the respondent's mark.165 
This strict definition of "use" for purposes of the statement of use 
was applied and justified in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Station Casinos, Inc. 166 
Hilton Hotels had filed a petition to cancel Station's registration of 
the mark WILD WILD WEST for hotel services and casino and gam­
bling services on the grounds that Station had not made sufficient use 
161. [d. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. at *16-17. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. at *2. 
166. 2000 TIAB LEXIS 187 (2000) (not citable as precedent). 
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of the mark at the time it filed its statement of use. 167 Although Sta­
tion had used the mark on a sign outside a pre-existing facility when it 
faced delays in plans for a new facility, the Board denied Station's 
motion for summary judgment.168 The Board found that: 
[W] hile [Station] made use of the mark prior to filing its statement 
of use, there remain genuine issues of material fact concerning (1) 
whether the scope and extent of [Station's] activities, prior to the 
filing of its statement of use in November, 1996, are sufficient to 
establish commercial scale use and (2) whether respondent made 
use of the mark prior to filing its statement of use sufficient to 
create an association with the offered hotel services. 169 
The Board justified this high standard by . looking to the legislative 
history of the TLRA and Congress's desire to eliminate the abuses of 
token use and to institute instead a "higher hurdle for the quantum 
and nature of use of a mark in commerce to qualify for 
registration."170 
The Board is thus taking a fairly demanding approach to deter­
mining the adequacy of statements of use, at least where such state­
ments are challenged by third parties. ITU applicants must therefore 
be careful to pass this examination or else find their applications or 
registrations invalidated. 
III. Procedural Problems Created by the TLRA 
The structure of the TLRA has created several procedural and 
interpretive problems for the PTO and for the courts. In part, these 
problems stem from the two step process for obtaining an intent to 
use registration. Under Section 1 (b), when a party applies for trade­
mark registration based on a bona fide intent to use the mark in com­
merce, the application is filed and examined preliminarily by the 
PTO, and if accepted, a notice of allowance will be issued.l71 The ap­
plicant then needs to file a timely statement of use as a prerequisite to 
registration itself. 172 When a statement of use is filed, the PTO again 
engages in an evaluation process before issuing a registration.173 
This two step process and the time delay between the steps have 
led to two different questions. First, what is the effect of the filing of 
167. See id. at *1. 
168. See id. at *2. 
169. [d. at *6-7. 
170. [d. at *6. 
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (b)(l) (A) (1994). 
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(I) (1994). 
173. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1052 (1994). 
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the lTV application with respect to other parties before the registra­
tion itself issues? Second, what issues can be raised at the time of the 
filing of the application, and what issues can be raised when the state­
ment of use is filed? 
A. 	 The Effect of Filing the Application and Receiving a Notice of 
Allowance 
Within two years of the effective date of the TLRA, the Trade­
mark Trial and Appeal Board had to resolve an important interpretive 
and procedural issue with respect to the effect on an applicant'S rights 
of the filing of the intent to use application. In Zirco Corp. v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph CO.,174 the applicant had filed an ITV applica­
tion for the mark DATACEL on January 11,1990.175 Shortly thereafter 
on April 15, 1990, the opposer allegedly made actual first use of the 
mark in commerce. 176 The opposer filed a notice of opposition to the 
registration of the applicant's mark on the basis of this first actual use, 
claiming priority of use.177 In response, the applicant relied on Sec­
tion 7(c) of the Trademark Act, which confers a right of priority as of 
the date of the filing of an application to register a mark as against any 
other person who "prior to such filing (1) has used the mark; [or] (2) 
has filed an application to register the mark which is pending or has 
resulted in registration of the mark ...."178 Such right of priority is, 
however, contingent upon the registration of the mark.179 Thus, ac­
cording to the applicant, since its filing date preceded the opposer's 
alleged first use, the applicant had priority by virtue of the construc­
tive use provision in Section 7(C).180 
Opposer argued in response that the constructive use date did 
not apply to the applicant because no registration had yet issued for 
the mark. Section 7(c) by its own terms said that its provisions for 
constructive use were "contingent upon registration." Since applicant 
had not yet perfected its rights in its mark by use and then registra­
tion, opposer contended that applicant could not "prevent opposer 
from acquiring common law rights in its mark"181 superior to the con­
tingent rights of applicant. 
174. 	 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 (T.T.A.B. 1991). 
175. 	 See id. 
176. 	 See id. 
177. See id. at 1542. 

17S. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994). 

179. See id. 

ISO. See Zirco, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543. 

lSI. Id. at 1543. 
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The Board concluded otheIWise; it reasoned that: 

It is true that a reading of Section 7(c) alone ... might be con­

strued to limit an applicant's right to rely upon the constructive 

use date as the first use date of its mark to post-registration actions. 

But the Board does not believe that such a literal interpretation of 

Section 7(c) can be adopted.182 
The Board examined the legislative history of the TLRA and found 
that the constructive use provision was "essential to the intent to use 
system. Without this provision, an intent-to-use applicant would be vul­
nerable to theft of its mark or to innocent use of the mark by anyone 
after filing of its application."183 Such vulnerability would defeat the 
goals of encouraging early filing of applications to give notice to po­
tential future users, giving lTV applicants superior rights over those 
who adopted a mark after the lTV application was filed, and prevent­
ing others from acquiring. common law rights after that filing date. 184 
Thus, the Board concluded, 
With these being the aims of the constructive use provision, there 
can be no doubt but that the right to rely upon the constructive 
use date comes into existence with the filing of the intent-to-use 
application and that an intent-to-use applicant can rely upon this 
date in.an opposition brought by a third party asserting common 
law rights. 185 
According to the Board, the "contingent upon registration" language 
in Section 7(c) only meant that no final judgment could be issued in 
favor of an lTV applicant until registration. 186 The Board recognized 
this interim state in the case before it by noting, after dismissing the 
opposition, that once the mark was registered, the applicant should 
inform the Board so that it could take steps to terminate the proceed­
ing. 187 Thus, no final judgment was to be entered, leaving parties with 
unsettled rights until registration itself is obtained. 188 
182. Id. at 1544. 
183. Id. 
184. See id. 
185. Id. 
186. See id. at 1544. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. at 1544-45. See also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:29 (concluding that 
lTV applicant should not be precluded from completing lTV application process by op­
poser who first uses mark after lTV constructive use date). Professor McCarthy also con­
cluded that the contingent nature of the rights provided to lTV applicants prior to 
registration could lead to considerable uncertainty. Although a party using a mark after 
the filing date of an lTV applicant could not be enjoined prior to registration of the lTV 
applicant's mark, that party is "living on borrowed time," id. at §§ 19:30, 19:64, and would 
be acting irrationally if it invested resources in using a mark the use of which could be 
enjoined once the lTV applicant obtained registration. McCarthy concluded that "the vast 
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Although Zirco appeared to resolve for the Trademark Board the 
question of the effect of constructive use before registration where an 
opposer files a notice of opposition to an· ITU application, federal 
courts have resolved the issue differently. In Talk to Me Products, Inc. v. 
Larami COrp.,189 the plaintiff, Talk to Me Products ("TTMP"), filed suit 
against the defendant Larami for trademark infringement with re~ 
spect to the mark TOTALLY RAD SUPER SOAKER to be used in con~ 
nection with water guns. 190 In part, TTMP claimed priority based on 
the ITU application it had filed on July 31, 1990, prior to Larami's 
alleged first actual use on August 24, 1990.191 Like the applicant in 
Zirco, TTMP claimed that it could rely on the constructive use provi­
sion even though its mark was not yet registered. 192 The district court 
disagreed, concluding that until TTMP's mark was registered, it could 
not rely on Section 7(c) to establish priority of use over Larami.193 
The court relied on the express language of Section 7(c) which made 
constructive use "contingent upon registration," finding that language 
unambiguous and observing that "[iJf Congress intended for con­
structive use to apply to a dispute like the <;ase at bar, but drafted the 
statute carelessly, Congress can redraft it."194 Unlike the Board, the 
court was not persuaded by the legislative history or the argument that 
such an interpretation would defeat the goals of the TLRA with re­
spect to ITU applications: "The central purpose of [Section 7(c)J-to 
foster intent-to-use applications-remains intact. An applicant obtains 
the advantages of constructive use. He just does not gain that advan­
tage until his mark is registered."195 
The court recognized that the Board had reached a different re­
sult in Zirco, but found the two results reconcilable based on the differ­
ent procedural contexts in which the issues had arisen: an opposition 
proceeding in Zirco and a summary judgment motion in a trademark 
majority of junior users, upon learning of a conflicting prior lTV application, will drop 
their activities under the disputed mark ... ." Id. at § 19:64. McCarthy, however, went on to 
note that since the lTV registrant will not be able to obtain injunctive relief without prov­
ing likelihood of confusion, a court might consider that post filingjunior user's investment 
and use of a mark in weighing the factors for determining injunctive relief, thus adding to 
the lTV applicant's uncertainty. Id. at §§ 19:65, 19:67. See also Jones, supra note 44, at 
167-77 (lTV applicants are left with inadequate remedies against infringing conduct oc­
curring after the filing date but prior to registration). 
189. 804 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
190. See id. at 556. 
191. See id. at 557. 
192. See id. at 558. 
193. See id. at 561. 
194. Id. at 560. 
195. Id. 
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infringement action in the case before it. 196 Whereas the party in Zirco 
was relying on Section 7(c) to protect itself against one trying to de­
feat its application, the plaintiff in Laramiwas relying on Section 7(c) 
to obtain affirmative relief against a purported infringer.197 
The Trademark Board itself had an opportunity to revisit this is­
sue when it decided the case involving Larami's opposition to TTMP's 
trademark application,198 a case it did not decide until after the dis­
trict court's decision described above. The Board affirmed the ap­
proach it had taken in Zirco, allowing TTMP to rely on its constructive 
use date to establish priority of use and agreed with the district court 
that the procedural context made the two outcomes reconcilable. 199 It 
stated: 
In a proceeding before the Board, whose jurisdiction is limited 
solely to the registration of the party's mark, it would defeat the 
purpose of filing an intent-to-use application if an applicant were 
not able to rely upon its constructive use date in defending its right 
to registration .... On the other hand, in a civil action involving a 
party's right to use a mark, such as ITMP's infringement action, it 
would not be equitable for an intent-to-use applicant to be entitled 
to rely upon a constructive use date prior to registration of its 
mark, and thus potentially prior to any use whatsoever, to defeat 
the common law rights of a first actual user of its mark.2oo 
The Board further noted that it would also allow an opposer to 
rely on Section 7 (c) to establish priority if it had the first filed applica­
tion for registration. "[I]n proceedings before the Board the construc­
tive use provisions of Section 7(c) may be used both defensively and 
offensively."20I Thus, Section 7(c) has different meanings depending 
on the procedural context in which its application arises. 
To complicate the situation further, a third twist on this scenario 
was presented in Warneroision Entertainment v. Empire of Carolina.202 In 
that case plaintiffWarnervision filed an action and obtained a prelimi­
nary injunction against Empire, claiming infringement of its trade­
mark REAL WHEELS.203 Empire had relied on its predecessor-in­
196. See id. 
197. See id. Accord, Fila Sport S.p.A. v. Diadora America, 141 F.R.D. 74 (N.D. III. 1991). 
See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:26 (concluding that legislative history would not 
support injunctive relief in favor of an lTV applicant prior to registration). 
198. See Larami Corp. v. Talk to Me Programs, Inc., 36 V.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840 
(T.T.A.B. 1995). 
199. See id. at 1845. 
200. [d. at 1845. 
201. [d. at 1845 n.7. 
202. 101 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1996). 
203. See id. 
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interest's filing of an lTD application on September 9, 1994, to estab­
lish priority and to protect itself against the preliminary injunction. 
The district court had granted the injunction in Warnervision's favor 
on the basis of its actual use of the mark and had refused to allow 
Empire to rely on Section 7(c) prior to registration of the mark.204 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court had mis­
applied Section 7(c) and thus had abused its discretion in granting 
Warnervision injunctive relief.205 Mter observing that Empire was not 
seeking "affirmative or offensive relief' against Warnervision, but 
rather was simply asserting Section 7(c) as "a defense to Warnervi­
sion's efforts to prevent it from completing the lTV registration pro­
cess,"206 the court, citing the Trademark Board's decisions in Zirco and 
Lammi, concluded that to deny Empire the protection of Section 7 (c) 
would defeat the purposes of the intent-ta-use legislation. It stated: 
The lTV provisions permit the holder of an ITU application to use 
the mark in commerce, obtain registration, and thereby secure pri­
ority retroactive to the date of filing the lTV application. Of course 
this right or privilege is not indefinite; it endures only for the time 
allotted by the statute. But as long as an lTV applicant's privilege 
has not expired, a court may not enjoin it from making the use 
necessary for registration on the grounds that another party has 
used the mark subsequent to the filing of the ITU application. To 
permit such an injunction would eviscerate the lTV provisions and 
defeat their very purpose.207 
Reading the Lammi court decision and Warnervision together, it 
seems then that although an ITV applicant cannot use Section 7(c) 
affirmatively in its infringement action against an alleged infringer 
before registration, it can use it to defend against injunctive relief if 
sued by another for trademark infringement. Section 7(c) seems to 
have been interpreted by the courts as applying only defensively to 
lTV applicants and not offensively, even though there is nothing in its 
language or the legislative history to support such a distinction. The 
Trademark Board is not as restrictive in its application of Section 7 (c) , 
allowing it to be used both defensively and offensively in opposition 
proceedings. Even at the Trademark Board, however, no final judg­
ment in favor of a party can be issued until its mark is registered. 
204. See id. at 26l. 
205. See id. at 262. 
206. [d. at 261. 
207. [d. at 262. Cf Windows User, Inc. v. Reed Bus. Publ'g. Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 103 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (where notice of allowance refused based on descriptive nature of mark, 
ITU applicant could not use its filing date to establish priority over defendant). 
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Thus, a party filing an lTV application has rights that are some­
what unclear. Even at the Board, nothing is truly final until registra­
tion, and in the courts, the applicant may only be able to rely on 
constructive use defensively and not to assert rights against another. 
This patchwork of interpretations renders the value of Section 7(c) 
and constructive use somewhat questionable. 
B. 	 The Two-Step Process: When and How Issues Regarding 
Registrability Are Raised in the lTV Process 
In addition to the unsettled value of constructive use, the lTV 
applicant faces a complex task of determining when and how issues 
regarding the registrability of the mark can be raised during the lTV 
process. As described above,208 the lTV application process follows 
several steps. The application is examined initially by the PTO, and a 
notice of allowance is issued unless the mark is found ineligible for 
protection or is successfully opposed.209 The applicant thereafter must 
file within the designated time period a statement of use demonstrat­
ing that the mark has actually been used in commerce.210 At this sec­
ond stage, the PTO engages in a second examination of the mark's 
registrability before issuing a registration.211 Many questions have 
arisen about what issues can be raised at that second examination. 
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prod­
ucts CO.,212 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue. 
Bell & Howell had filed an lTV application for the marks "6200," 
"6800," and "8100" for microfilm reader/printers. The marks were 
published for the opposition, and Kodak filed a notice of opposition 
against the marks, claiming that the marks would be used as model 
designators and thus would be merely descriptive and ineligible for 
protection without secondary meaning in accordance with Section 
2(e) of the Trademark Act.213 The Board dismissed the opposition, 
ruling that since the marks had not yet been used, the issue of descrip­
tiveness could not be determined at that time.214 A notice of allow­
ance was thus issued in Bell & Howell's favor. 215 Kodak appealed the 
Board's decision, arguing that the Board had improperly created an 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See id. 
212. 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
213. See id. at 1570. 
214. See id. at 1571. 
215. See id. 
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implied presumption that numerical marks were not merely descrip­
tive and that the creation of that presumption was not a reasonable 
interpretation of the Board's authority under the Trademark Act.216 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the TLRA 
and concluded that "Congress intended most marks applied for in an 
intent-to-use application ... [would] be reviewed for descriptiveness 
in the initial examination/pre-use stage of the intent-to-use applica­
tion process."217 It further found that Congress intended that the sec­
ond examination at the statement of use stage would be for issues that 
"could not have been fully considered during the initial examination 
of the application ...."218 As the Senate Report on the TLRA de­
scribed, the second examination was to be limited to issues such as: 
Whether the person filing the statement of use is the applicant, 
whether the mark as used corresponds to the drawing submitted 
with the application, whether the goods or services were identified 
in the application and not subsequently deleted, and whether the 
mark, as displayed in the specimens or facsimiles, functions as a mark.219 
Thus, Congress did foresee that some issues, including the ability 
of the mark to function as a mark, could not be fully evaluated at the 
initial, pre-use examination. 
The court concluded that the Board was reasonable in deferring 
full consideration of the descriptiveness of Bell & Howell's marks until 
the second, post-use examination.220 It reasoned that although the 
Board could find certain·marks to be prima facie merely descriptive at 
the initial examination, for other marks it would not be so clear.221 
Even in those cases, however, passing the initial examination did not 
mean that the mark would automatically be registered since it would 
be re-examined at the post-use stage.222 
The court cited several PTO regulations regarding that post-use 
examination and the standard to be used for determining which is­
sues could be raised at this second inquiry.223 The court also relied on 
Trademark Examination Guide 3-89, which provides that the PTO "will 
not issue any requirements or refusals ... [when examining the state­
216. See id. at 1570-72. 
217. Id. at 1572. 
218. Id. at 1572 (quoting S. REp No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 V.S.C.CAN. 5577, 5596). 
219. S. REp. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988), reprinted in 1988 V.S.C.CAN. 
5577, 5596 (emphasis added). 
220. See ~astrnan Kodak Co., 994 F.2d at 1571. 
221. See id. at 1572. 
222. Id. at 1572-73. 
223. See id. at 1573. 
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ment of use] which could have or should have been raised during the 
initial examination, unless the failure to do so in initial examination 
constitutes a clear error."224 "Clear error" was defined as "an error 
which, if not corrected, would result in issuance of a registration in 
violation of the [Trademark] Act."225 Moreover, the Trademark Exami­
nation Guide provides a specific standard with respect to re-examina­
tion for alleged mere descriptiveness: "[T] he examining attorney may 
not issue a refusal [on the grounds of mere descriptiveness] ... unless 
the refusal is dictated by changed circumstances from the time of the 
initial examination or the failure to issue such a refusal would consti­
tute clear error."226 
In spite of this demanding standard limiting the bases for refusal 
at the second examination stage, the court concluded that the Board 
could re-examine Bell & Howell's marks for descriptiveness at the 
post-use stage, reas~ning that such use itself might be considered 
"changed circumstances" and that without actual use, the PTO could 
not determine the descriptiveness of numerical marks.227 Kodak ar­
gued that this deferral of the determination of descriptiveness was 
prejudicial to its interests and that it created a different standard for 
lTV marks than that used for use-based applications.228 The Court 
rejected both arguments, resting in large part on the fact that this two­
step process was what Congress had intended by enacting the 
TLRA.229 
In In re Parfums Schiaparelli,230 the Trademark Board shed more 
light on this issue. The applicant had filed an lTV application for the 
mark SCHIAPARELLI for fragrances; the applicant owned a registra­
tion for the same mark for related goods and claimed distinctiveness 
of the mark on the basis of this prior registration.23 I No opposition 
was filed, the notice of allowance issued, and on January 24, 1994, the 
applicant submitted its statement of use and three specimens of 
use.232 At the post-use examination of this statement of use, the exam­
ining attorney refused registration, finding clear error in the earlier 
224. t:'astman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1573 (quoting TRADEMARK EXAMINATION GUIDE 3-89 
§ A-9(b)). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. See also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:22-19:24. 
227. See id. 
228. See Eastman Kodak Co., 994 F.2d at 1573. 
229. See id. at 1573-76. See Easunan Kodak v. Bell & Howell: A Reaffirmation of the "Rea­
sonableness" Standard, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH LJ. 251 (1994). 
230. 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1864 (T.T.A.B. 1995). 
231. See id. at 1865. 
232. See id. 
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approval on the grounds that applicant's mark was likely to cause con­
fusion with another previously registered mark owned by a third 
party.233 In response, the applicant argued that its use of the mark 
under its earlier registration had long co-existed with the other party's 
use of its registered mark on different goods and that therefore there 
had been no clear error at the initial examination with respect to like­
lihood of confusion.234 
The Board reviewed the standard for clear error and the legisla­
tive history regarding the scope of the second examination described 
in Bell & Howell as well as the additional history which indicated that 
the examinations of the statements of use could also include an exam­
ination of the factors set forth in Sections 2(a) through 2(e), which 
. includes likelihood of confusion with a pre-existing mark.235 Re-exam­
ination on the basis of these provisions, however, was intended to be 
quite limited, that is, "for purposes of considering issues that could 
not have been addressed before the notice of allowance was issued 
and use was initiated."236 Given the narrow scope allowed for the post­
use review, the Board agreed with the applicant that the issuing of the 
notice of allowance was not clear error, even though there was con­
flicting evidence with respect to the likelihood of confusion. There­
fore the Board reversed the second examiner's refusal to register 
applicant's mark.237 
Given the Board's stringent interpretation of what will constitute 
"clear error," Kodak's concerns may not have been groundless. If the 
PTO and the Board are disinclined to re-examine for issues such as 
descriptiveness or likely confusion at the post-use examination, and 
initial examiners are willing to defer such issues to that later stage as 
in Kodak, lTV applicants may be able to obtain registration without a 
thorough review of the issues at either stage. 
The matter is further complicated by the Board's treatment of 
analogous issues in the context of a cancellation petition. In Salacuse 
233. See id. at 1865-66. 
234. See id. at 1866. 
235. See id. at 1868-69. 
236. Id. at 1869 n.22 (quoting United States Trademark Association, The Trademark 
Law Revision Act of 1988,344 (1989». The Board recounted in detail the legislative his­
tory of these sections, pointing out that the House had amended the original Senate bill to 
expand the scope of the statement of use examination to include the factors set forth in 
Sections 2(a) through (e) of the Lanham Act. In the subsequent Senate debate on the 
change, Senator DeConcini expressed the Senate's desire to provide applicants with suffi­
cient certainty once they had received the notice of allowance and opined that the second 
examination should be very limited in its scope, even with the House amendments. Id. 
237. See id. at 1868. 
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v. Ginger SPirits,23B Salacuse petitioned to cancel Ginger Spirits's regis­
tration for the mark SOVTH BEACH BEER for use in connection 
with sales of beer.239 Ginger Spirits had filed an ITV application three 
months after Salacuse had filed two lTV applications for SOUTH 
BEACH in connection with various goods including beer.240 Although 
Salacuse's applications had been filed first, the PTO granted a notice 
of allowance to Ginger Spirits.241 Mter filing its statement of use, Gin­
ger Spirits was awarded registration of the mark.242 While Salacuse's 
applications were still pending, Salacuse received a notice of allow­
ance for one of its applications whereas the other was refused on the 
basis of Ginger Spirits's registration.243 
Salacuse based its petition to cancel Ginger Spirits's registrations 
on priority of use and likelihood of confusion, arguing that since his 
applications were filed first, he had the earlier constructive use date 
and thus priority.244 In response, Ginger Spirits argued in part that 
Salacuse's ITU applications were invalid because Salacuse had lacked 
a bona fide intention to use the marks.245 Salacuse moved for sum­
maryjudgment, arguing that the validity of his lTV applications could 
not be raised in this proceeding where Ginger Spirits's registration 
was at issue and not Salacuse's trademark applications. Ginger Spirits 
responded that to deny it the opportunity to challenge Salacuse's ap­
plications would be inequitable, given that Salacuse was relying on 
those very applications to establish priority of use.246 The Board 
agreed with Ginger Spirits that Salacuse's applications were not im­
mune to challenge where Salacuse was relying on their validity as the 
basis of his cancellation petition.247 The Board reasoned, 
[Salacuse's] constructive use priority is contingent upon the matur­
ing of his prior-filed applications into registrations .... In view of 
... [Ginger Spirits's] pleaded challenge to the validity of ... 
[Salacuse's] applications, and because ... [Salacuse] bears the ulti­
mate burden of proof on the priority issue, it is not inequitable to 
require [Salacuse] to go beyond the mere pendency of ... [his] 
238. 	 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415 (T.T.A.B. 1997). 
239. See id. at ]416-17. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. 
242. See id. at 1416. 
243. See id. at 1416 n.l. 
244. See id. at 1416-17. 
245. See id. at ] 417. 
246. See id. at 1418. 
247. See id. 
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applications and establish his entitlement to the registrations upon 
which his priority claim is based.248 
Because the issue of Salacuse's bona fide intention to use was a ques­
tion of fact, the Board denied Salacuse's motion for summary judg­
ment.249 The Board recognized that this conclusion raised several 
procedural issues not specifically addressed in the statute.250 Ginger 
Spirits could not file a counterclaim against Salacuse to "cancel" his 
lTV applications because the Board did not have jurisdiction over 
those applications in the proceedings to cancel the Ginger Spirits's 
registration.251 Ginger Spirits could only raise the issue by way of an 
affirmative defense. Thus, if after trial Salacuse was found to have 
lacked a bona fide intention to use the mark, that finding would be 
sufficient to protect Ginger Spirits against the priority claim, and 
Salacuse's cancellation petition would be denied. As the Board ob­
served, in such a case Ginger Spirits'S registration would act as a bar to 
Salacuse's lTV applications, and even if such applications were to ma­
ture to registration, that registration would be subject to cancellation 
on the basis of Ginger Spirits'S own registration.252 The Board further 
observed that if, on the other hand, Salacuse withstood the challenge 
to his applications, he would still not be entitled to any final relief 
against Ginger Spirits unless and until his applications matured into 
registrations.253 
This case illustrates several procedural problems created by the 
TLRA and the lTV regime. First, there is the lack of any mechanism 
for a counterclaim against a petitioner who relies onhis application to 
establish priority, resulting in duplicative proceedings and incomplete 
resolutions. Second, there is the previously noted problem of lack of 
finality until registrations issue, leaving the various parties unclear as 
to their rights. Moreover, tile case indicates that there is some confu­
sion at the PTO regarding the treatment of lTV applications.254 
248. Id. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. at 1419. 
251. See id. 
252. See id. at 1420. 
253. See id. at 1418-19 n.8. 
254. In a footnote discussing one of Salacuse's ITU applications, the Board gave the 
following description 	of the status of that application: 
Although the parties have referred to application Serial No. 74/370,621 as having 
been abandoned, it appears from the Office's records that the application is still 
pending. A notice of allowance originally was issued with respect to the applica­
tion on February 22, 1994, but that notice of allowance apparently was cancelled 
on August 22, 1994. Despite the cancellation of the notice of allowance, several 
requests to extend time to file a statement of use were filed by petitioner and 
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The case also illustrates that although the Board may not ques­
tion some issues resolved at the initial examination of the ITU applica­
tion, such issues may be raised anew by other parties, either by way of 
an affirmative defense or by a petition to cancel a mark once it is 
registered. 
IV. 	 Have the Objectives of the Intent to Use Legislation 
Been Achieved? 
As discussed above, Congress had several justifications for amend­
ing the trademark laws in 1988 to allow applicants to file for trade­
mark registration on the basis of their intent to use the mark as 
opposed to actual use of the mark in commerce. In part, Congress 
wanted to eliminate the disadvantages that the use requirement im­
posed on American businesses as compared to foreign trademark ap­
plicants who could obtain a United States registration without use of 
the mark by relying on their home country registration. Congress 
wanted to provide American businesses with a more certain and effi­
cient way of ensuring protection of trademark without relying on the 
"sham" of token use. Thus, certainty and predictability were key goals 
of the ITU scheme embodied in the TLRA.255 
How effective has the legislation proved to be in accomplishing 
those goals? Although there are undoubtedly some advantages for 
those who can now file applications on the basis of intent to use and 
who face no challenges to those applications, for those who anticipate 
or experience such challenges, there is at least as much uncertainty 
and perhaps more than there had been prior to the enactment of the 
TLRA. 
First of all, the TLRA did not eliminate the ambiguities involved 
in defining what will constitute "first use" for purposes of determining 
priority as between two claimants to a mark. Courts continue to apply 
differing tests to determine whether a claimant has engaged in suffi­
cient activity to claim priority. The vagueness of the "use analogous to 
trademark use" doctrine has only been exacerbated by the need to 
approved by the Office. It is unclear from the record why the notice of allowance 
was cancelled, or why the extension requests were filed and approved after can­
cellation of the Notice of Allowance. In any event, a second notice of allowance 
appears to have been issued on April 8, 1997, to which petitioner's first response, 
i.e., a statement of use or a request to extend time to file a statement of use, is due 
on October 8, 1997. 
Id. at 1416 n.1. 
255. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 38-44. 
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modifY the doctrine in cases where an application has been made 
under the intent to use section.256 
In addition, the TLRA has added new burdens for those who ap­
ply under the lTV section. A party who files an opposition to such an 
application arguing that the applicant lacks a bona fide intent to use 
seems to have a fairly easy means of forcing a full factual determina­
tion on that question, given the reluctance of the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board to grant summary judgment to applicants on that 
issue. The standard of proof is so unclear that parties trying to estab­
lish their bona fide intent to use will face considerable uncertainty 
and delay in the processing of the lTV applications.257 
Moreover, the lTV applicant still needs to prove actual use before 
registration of the trademark will be granted. As the cases indicate, 
the Board has taken a very strict approach to evaluating the state­
ments of use filed by lTV applicants. Thus, again the lTV applicant 
faces uncertainty; even after it has obtained a notice of allowance, it 
cannot be confident of its ability to obtain registration in the long run 
without proving "use" under a demanding test.258 
This uncertainty is compounded when one considers the other 
problems faced by the lTV applicant. Although its notice of allowance 
will provide it with priority based on the constructive use provision in 
an opposition proceeding, the notice will not provide it with the abil­
ity to obtain affirmative relief in federal court against an infringer un­
less and until the mark has been registered.259 The lTV applicant also 
faces some uncertainty with respect to the determination of its mark's 
eligibility for registration. The statute allows for two different opportu­
nities for the Board to determine the mark's suitability for registra­
tion: once during the pre-use notice of allowance stage and a second 
during the post-use registration stage. The cases indicate that while 
the second examination is intended to be quite limited in scope, the 
Board may defer some determinations of eligibility, for example, de­
terminations of the descriptiveness of the mark, until that second ex­
amination. Thus, the lTV applicant may find that its hopes for 
registration based on the notice of allowance were unfounded.260 
What does this all add up to for those who wish to rely on the lTV 
application process? For some lTV applicants, and those seeking to 
256. See supra text accompanying notes 93-153. 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 63-192. 
258. See supra text accompanying notes 155-70. 
259. See supra text accompanying notes 174-207. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 208-54. 
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challenge them, it would seem that there will be increased confusion 
and uncertainty. Thus, it may be that Congress failed to achieve one 
of the key objectives of the TLRA: increased certainty and predictabil­
ity for American businesses. 
Conclusion: Congress Should Re-evaluate and Amend the lTV 
Provisions of the TLRA 
Senator DeConcini, in his remarks on the bill that became the 
TLRA, stated that if certain provisions of that bill "serve to reduce the 
certainty the intent-to-use system is meant to provide, or prove bur­
densome to either applicants or the PTO, Congress should expedi­
tiously consider revising the system so it can meet its stated 
objectives."261 As it is now more than ten years since the lTV system 
was instituted, it would appear that it is time for Congress to conduct 
its own evaluation of the system to see whether it is meeting its objec­
tives or whether that system should be revised. 
Although Congress would not and should ,not turn back the clock 
and eliminate intent to use as a basis for trademark application, it 
should consider taking some steps to reduce some of the uncertainties 
described above. For example, perhaps it is now time to jump off the 
fence Congress has been straddling since 1988 and allow for registra­
tion before actual use of the mark, as is done in many foreign na­
tions.262 A party could still forfeit that registration for failure to use 
after a specified period of time, if so challenged by another user, but 
until such a challenge, the party would have all the rights of a trade­
mark registrant as provided by the Lanham Act. Such a change would 
eliminate the need for the evaluation of the applicant's statement of 
use and for the second examination of the mark itself. 
Congress should also consider statutorily eliminating or limiting 
the "use analogous to trademark use" doctrine, which allows one to 
oppose a registration based not on actual use before the application, 
but only on "use analogous" to such use. Perhaps it would make more 
sense to create a system where the first to file has priority, regardless 
of any promotional or other activities of another. 
261. Congo Rec. S16973 (October 20, 1988 daily ed.) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
262. See generally CandidaJohnson and Robert Baugh, The Enforcement of Trade Mark 
Rights in Europe (1999). See also Alejandro Guanes-Mersan, A General Comparative Overview 
of Trademark Regulations Between the United States and Paraguay, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & COMPo 
LAw 775, 789-90, 793 (1999); Shilpa Mehta and Leslie Steele Smith, An American Practi­
tioner's Guide to the Developing System of Trademark Law Within the EurojJean Union, 3 TEX. 
INTELL. PRop.LJ. 85,95,98-99 (1995). 
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Finally, Congress should consider providing some way in which 
an lTV applicant can establish its bona fide intention to use so that it 
will not be subject to easy challenges by opposers looking for a way to 
delay the lTV process. For example, Congress could impose on an 
opposer the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the applicant, 
rather than forcing the applicant to prove its own good faith. 
The TLRA was an important change in American trademark law 
and one that has been generally viewed as a major benefit to Ameri­
can trademark owners. It is not without its flaws, however, and some 
steps should be taken to improve the lTV system so that it better ac­
complishes Congress's intended objective of reducing uncertainty for 
American trademark owners. 
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